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THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
Sharon C. Streett"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), originally
enacted in 1975, requires states, through their local school districts, to
provide education for children with disabilities.' This act was initially
necessary because at the time of enactment eight million children were
identified as having disabilities, and of those, nearly half a million were not
receiving an appropriate education; another million were excluded from
school altogether; and an unknown number of children were suspected of
having unidentified disabilities due to their lack of success in school.2 The
IDEA requires states, through their school districts, to identify children ages
three to twenty-one who have disabilities, develop appropriate individualized
educational programs for them, and provide these services in the least
restrictive environment, preferably in a public school. Over the last twenty
years, the IDEA has resulted in a significant increase in the number of
children with disabilities identified and served by public schools.3
Although much of the IDEA addresses the financial framework through
which states receive federal assistance for educating children with disabili-
ties, it also gives these children the substantive right to a free, appropriate,
public education (FAPE). FAPE is achieved through a procedural scheme
designed to ensure that, when the IDEA procedures are followed, the result
will be a FAPE designed specifically for the individual child.4 The U.S.
Office of Education has promulgated regulations implementing the IDEA
and setting forth in detail the procedural requirements of the IDEA. As a
condition of the IDEA funding, each state must adopt state procedures that
implement the IDEA procedural framework at the state and local levels.6
* Sharon C. Streett is a private attorney who frequently represents parents of children
with disabilities and local school districts in administrative proceedings and litigation under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act. She also trains and consults with parent groups and
employees in the area of disability law. Prior to private practice, Ms. Streett was legal
counsel to the Arkansas Department of Education.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1994). The IDEA was formerly the Education of the
Handicapped Act and, in part, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b)(1), (3), (4), (5) (1994).
3. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES (1995).
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(B)-(C) (1994).
5. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300-300.754 (1995).
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1231g, 1411(a)(1), 1412(1), (2)(c), 1412 (1994); 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.110, .111, .128, .701 (1995).
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When the federal regulations are read in conjunction with the state IDEA
regulations, they provide local schools with specific guidelines and
directions for carrying out the procedural mandates of the IDEA.7
The local school districts' compliance with the IDEA's procedural
scheme and the assessment of the substantive results in individual cases
have given rise to a large body of IDEA case law. The purpose of this
article is to give the attorney, who does not practice in this field, a general
overview of not only what the IDEA requires of local school districts in
relation to children with disabilities, but also what remedies are available to
the parents of these children who find the IDEA has not produced the
intended result. This information may also be beneficial to attorneys who
represent school districts by identifying potential liability risks under the
IDEA.
II. THE PROCEDURAL SCHEME.
A. Identification
As a condition of receiving federal funds, the IDEA requires states to
ensure that children with disabilities, ages three to twenty-one, are identified,
located, and served.8 Through the State Department of Education, Arkansas
requires each local school district to identify, locate, and evaluate all
children with disabilities, ages three to twenty-one, within each district's
jurisdiction and to assist with identification of the population ages zero
through two through activities labeled "child find."9 The State, through the
7. See, e.g., ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., REFERRAL, PLACEMENT AND APPEAL
PROCEDURES FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION AND RELATED SERVICES (1993) [hereinafter ARKANSAS
DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES]; ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROGRAM STANDARDS AND
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION (1993) [hereinafter ARKANSAS DEP'T OF
EDUC., STANDARDS].
8. States have the option of serving children ages zero through two with disabilities
through a grant program similar to the grants provided under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1471
(1994); 34 C.F.R. § 303 (1995). Arkansas, through the Arkansas Department of Human
Services, has elected to apply for and receive federal funds to serve this age population. As
a condition of the "zero through two" or "Part H" grant, the state must identify, locate, and
serve children with disabilities in this age group. 34 C.F.R. § 303 (1995). Arkansas meets
this obligation through cooperative efforts of the Arkansas Department of Human Services
and the Arkansas Department of Education with most of the actual services provided through
the cooperative efforts of both departments. Children ages three through five are served in
many cases by regional educational cooperatives. Arkansas meets its obligations to children
ages five to twelve primarily through the Arkansas Department of Education. The
department works with a number of state agencies under interagency agreements to ensure
services to children with disabilities in these age populations.
9. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 1.
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Department of Education, must submit a "State Plan" every three years
outlining its compliance with the requirements of the IDEA including the
"child find" activity." Each Arkansas school district, in turn, must then
submit a plan to the State Department of Education identifying how the
district will comply with the "child find" requirements.1 Districts are also
required to maintain records evidencing the activities they carry out in
compliance with these "child find" plans. 2
A school district's obligation to locate and identify children with
disabilities lasts until a child turns twenty-one.' 3 Not all disabilities are
apparent early on, and many disabilities result from injuries or serious
illnesses which can occur in a child's later years.'4 When a child exhibits
characteristics that would raise suspicion of a disability, schools have an
obligation to act regardless of the child's age within the three to twenty-one
range.15
B. Referral
Children with suspected disabilities are "referred" for consideration of
whether the child has a disability requiring services. 6 Anyone with relevant
knowledge about a child can refer a child for this consideration.' 7 The most
common referrals are from teachers and parents, but the district has an
obligation to consider a referral from anyone with relevant information. In
accordance with state procedure, referrals must be put in writing on an
official "referral form" and forwarded to the school's principal or someone
the principal has designated for this purpose. 8 A verbal referral made to
school personnel is sufficient, but the school must record it on a referral
form and forward it to the appropriate school official."' School districts are
responsible for interpreting a parent's request for assistance as a referral
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.310 (1995).
11. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 1.
12. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 1.
13. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 1.
14. For example learning disabilities are usually diagnosed by determining that a child
has a severe ability-achievement discrepancy. This is difficult to demonstrate before a child
begins achievement level testing in school and even then it may be several years before the
discrepancy reaches the necessary severity to indicate a learning disability. Traumatic brain
injury is an acquired disability caused by head injury which may occur at any time.
15. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 1.
16. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
17. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
18. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
19. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
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(whether the word "referral" is used or not), when it is coupled with
information that raises suspicion of a disability.20
The school has seven days from this referral to meet in a "referral
conference" to consider whether the child may have a disability.2 The
parents must be invited and receive a notice that gives the date, time, and
place the conference is to be held, who will be there, what the conference
is for, what information will be used to make decisions, and any other
relevant information.22 These conferences are to be scheduled at mutually
agreeable times with enough notice for the parents to make arrangements to
be present.23 If the parents do not respond to the district's first notice, the
school must give them a second opportunity to respond by rescheduling the
meeting seven days from the second notice.24 The regulations give schools
a total of twenty-one days from the referral date to meet in a referral
conference.2
Three people must attend a referral conference: the principal, or person
he has designated to serve this function; one of the child's teachers (or one
who may become his teacher if he is entering school); and one other person,
normally the parent. The parent and the district may bring others to the
conference, and the child may also attend.26 Information about the child is
reviewed at the conference, and a decision is made by the group on whether
to evaluate the child for special education eligibility. 7 Parents must consent
to the initial evaluation.28 Schools must send the parents a written notice of
the decision made at the meeting.29 If the decision is made to evaluate, the
district is responsible for securing an appropriate evaluation.30 If the group
decides an evaluation is not called for, it may be appropriate to consider the
20. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
21. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
22. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.504-505 (1995).
23. Id. §§ 300.345(a)(1)-(2).
24. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
25. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
26. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2. See also 34
C.F.R. § 300.344 (1995) (providing that at each meeting, the following persons must
participate: (1) a school representative qualified to provide and/or supervise special
education; (2) the child's teacher; (3) one or both parents; (4) the child, if appropriate; (5)
others at the discretion of the school and/or parents); Id. § 300.345 (providing that parents
are required to be present at the initial meeting only; thereafter, they must be given the
opportunity to attend).
27. If the parents disagree with the group's decision, they may invoke due process
procedures to resolve the disagreement. See infra part I.F.
28. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504 (1995); ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note
7, part I, § 2.
29. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part I, § 2.
30. 34 C.F.R. § 300.352 (1995).
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student for eligibility under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.3 1 If the
parents disagree with the decision regarding evaluation, they may invoke the
due process procedures to resolve the issue.32
C. Evaluation
If the decision is made to evaluate a child, evaluation procedures must
be completed within sixty calendar days from the date the parents receive
notice of the decision to evaluate.3 3 The purpose of the evaluation is to
establish eligibility for special education, provide the basis for planning the
child's program, determine any necessary related services, and decide the
child's placement. The school district is responsible for obtaining this
evaluation.34 However, if the parents have had an independent evaluation
conducted, the school must consider it, if offered, along with their own
information. If the parents disagree with the school's evaluation, they may
request an independent evaluation. The school district has the option of
paying for the independent evaluation or seeking a due process hearing to
show that its own evaluation is sufficient.36 There are specific requirements
and certain components that by regulation must be included in the evalua-
tion. For certain types of disabilities, more specialized tests or activities are
required in addition to the standard components of an evaluation.37
D. The Evaluation/Programming Conference
Once the evaluation is complete, an evaluation/programming conference
is held. Participants at this meeting are subject to the meeting and notice
requirements of 34 C.F.R. § 300.344. 3' At this evaluation conference, a
determination is first made as to whether the child has a disability and
whether the child needs special education because of that disability. If the
child is determined eligible, an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) is
developed which includes any necessary related services and the least
31. Id. § 104.35.
32. See infra part I.F.
33. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part II.
34. 34 C.F.R. § 300.531 (1995).
35. Id. § 300.503(c)(1).
36. Id. § 300.503(b). ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part II,
§ 2.
37. 34 C.F.R. § 300.352 (1995). ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note
7, part I, § 3.
38. See supra note 26 for listing of necessary participants.
1996]
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restrictive environment in which the plan can be implemented.39 Parents
must consent to the initial placement of the child in special education.' The
IEP is implemented immediately following its development, assuming school
is in session, with a short delay allowed only to arrange transportation or
other related services.4
E. Annual Review
Each year the school is required to conduct a review of the child's IEP
to ascertain the student's progress and to consider revisions.42 Placement in
special education must also be reviewed annually.43 These reviews are
conducted at an "annual review" held toward the end of the school year in
some school districts, and at the beginning of the school year in others. The
annual review conference must be attended by three persons, one of whom
is the child's teacher, and the parents must be invited and notified as for the
other conferences. 44
Other reviews may be 6onducted at any time during the year if the
district or the parents feel one is needed. In Arkansas, these optional
meetings are called Separate Programming Conferences.' The participant
and notice requirements must also be met for a Separate Programming
Conference. 47  This conference is often held to consider behavioral
problems, dismissal from special education, particular problems with the
educational program, requests for additional services, and any other
individual issues that cannot wait for the annual review.
F. Due Process
When disagreements arise between the parents and the school district
about eligibility, evaluation, programming, or placement, a due process
hearing procedure may be invoked to resolve disputes. 4' The Arkansas
39. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343 (1995).
40. Id. § 300.504.
41. Id. § 300.342.
42. Id. § 300.343(d).
43. Id. § 300.552(a)(1).
44. See supra note 26.
45. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412 (2)(b), (4)(6), 1414 (a)(5) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.343 (1995).
46. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part III, § 4.
47. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.343-.345 (1995).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.500-.515 (1995). ARKANSAS DEP'T OF
EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part V.
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Department of Education employs hearing officers on a contract basis to
hear disputes and issue opinions.49
The due process hearing is supposed to be completed within forty-five
days of a hearing request.5° However, given the complex nature of some of
these cases, this is frequently impossible. Either party can request additional
time and can waive the time lines, but ultimately, the hearing officer
determines whether the forty-five day schedule must be maintained.5
When the school district and a parent disagree about a proposed change
in a child's educational placement, the IDEA provides for the child to
remain in her present educational placement until the administrative dispute
or subsequent judicial proceeding is resolved.52 This "stay put" provision
is designed to provide continuity and stability for the child who otherwise
might be bounced back and forth between placements during disputes.53
The school district and parents can agree to change the child's placement
pending resolution of the dispute.54
The hearing procedure provides for very limited discovery. Each party
must exchange the names of witnesses and exhibits five days before the
hearing.55 No other discovery procedure is provided. Parents have a right
to compel the attendance of witnesses,56 but in Arkansas this right exists
only to the extent the parents' witnesses are school employees, and to the
extent schools can make their employees cooperate. Because there is
currently no subpoena power in Arkansas for these hearings, the hearing
officer cannot compel attendance of witnesses. Parents have no other
subpoena power and frequently have difficulty getting their own physicians
and other professionals to appear and testify.57
In Arkansas, only limited procedures exist to guide the attorney in due
process proceedings. The State Department of Education publishes very
49. Each of the three current hearing officers used by the Department of Education are
professionals with full time practices outside their hearing work. All three have some
experience in testing and evaluation, one is a psychologist and the other two are attorneys.
Additional hearing officers are being trained.
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (1995).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (c) (1995). ARKANSAS DEP'T OF
EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII, § 5.
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a) (1995).
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a) (1995).
54. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1995).
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(3) (1995); ARKANSAS DEP'T OF
EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII, § 3(c).
56. 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1995).
57. The IDEA and the implementing referral regulations provide that parties have the
right to compel the attendance of witnesses at hearings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1994); 34
C.F.R. § 1415(d) (1995). Arkansas is not in compliance with this provision.
1996]
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basic guidelines for conducting the due process hearing, and these generally
parallel the federal regulations.5" The Arkansas Department of Education
Regulations provide some limitations on how evidence is presented. 9 These
regulations also direct the hearing office in how to consider certain
evidence.60 For example, testimony of medical doctors is limited to the
child's medical condition unless the doctor holds credentials in another
field.61 In considering the qualifications of witnesses, the regulations
attempt to limit considerations to whether or not a teacher is fully or
provisionally certified.62
Practice before one hearing officer is somewhat different than practice
before another. Two of the hearing officers are attorneys and one is not.
Evidence rules are different depending upon the hearing officer who hears
the case. The hearing officers and the Department of Education have
adopted some ad hoc practices that are designed to assist hearing officers.
Hearing officers issue prehearing orders requesting information and setting
a schedule for submission of the information and the hearing date.63
Currently a prehearing report or brief to the hearing officer is required along
with the names of witnesses and exhibits.' Post trial briefs are also usually
required. Although these due process hearings are quasi-judicial procedures,
the attorney time and effort involved is substantially similar to a non-jury
trial.
Which party has the burden of proof in due process hearings has
generally been left for the individual states to determine. There is no
provision in the IDEA or its implementing regulations allocating the burden
of proof. In Arkansas, school districts initially had the burden of proof.
When the State Plan was revised in 1993, this burden was shifted to the
party requesting the hearing, whether the parents or the school. A few
courts have imposed their own views upon the burden of proof issue.65
The issues involved in due process hearings run the gamut from narrow
and finite, such as whether the district should provide specialized transporta-
tion as a related service, to broad and encompassing, such as whether the
child has been denied a free appropriate public education and should receive
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-.509 (1995); ARKANSAS DEP'T OF
EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII.
59. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII, § 5(7)-(11).
60. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII, § 5(12).
61. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII, § 5(12).
62. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII, § 5(16).
63. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII, § 5(16).
64. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7, part VII, § 5(16).
65. See, e.g., Lasceri v. Ramapo Indian Hills Regional H.S. Dist., 560 A.2d 1180 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1989).
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compensatory services. In the early years of the IDEA, placement was a
frequent issue. In recent years, eligibility and programming have become
more common issues.
In Arkansas, once a hearing officer issues a decision, the parties have
thirty days within which to file an appeal with a court of competent
jurisdiction.66 This short appeal period creates significant problems for the
parties in cases where a hearing officer directs the parties to have a
conference to develop a program in accordance with his or her opinion. The
appeal time may run before the conference is concluded if at the conference
it becomes apparent that only an appeal will resolve the issues. 67 The IDEA
authorizes a party aggrieved by a due process hearing result to bring a civil
action in a state court of competent jurisdiction or in a U.S. District Court
without regard to the amount in controversy. In such an action, the record
of the proceedings below is received, but the court may also consider
additional evidence at the request of a party. A decision at this level is
based upon a preponderance of the evidence and the court may grant "such
relief as the court determines appropriate. 68
III. ELIGIBILITY
There are two components to eligibility under the IDEA. Not all
children with disabilities are eligible. First, a student must have one of the
following disabilities: mental retardation; hearing impairment including
deafness; speech or language impairments; visual impairments including
blindness; serious emotional disturbance; orthopedic impairments; autism;
traumatic brain injury; other health impairments; a specific learning
disability; or a combination of these disabilities. Second, as a result of the
disability, the student must need special education and related services.69
"Special education" is defined as "specially designed instruction, at no
cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability
.... 70 While there is no agreed upon definition of "specially designed
66. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-41-216(e) (Michie Supp. 1995). In some states there is an
intermediate appeal to the State Education Agency. This stage has been omitted in Arkansas.
67. Hearing officers are trained by the Arkansas Department of Education which heavily
emphasizes the importance of parties following IDEA procedures. Hearing officers
frequently order parties to go back through the procedures for developing a program using
some guidelines from the hearing officer rather than resolving the parties' dispute. From the
author's experience, this prolongs disputes and promotes further litigation.
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1994).
69. Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1) (1995). Three to five year olds with disabilities are
those children who are experiencing developmental delays in physical, cognitive,
communication, social, emotional, or adaptive development. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(2)(1) (1995).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17 (1995).
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instruction," case law indicates that it is not limited to traditional academic
instruction in the classroom, although classroom instruction using the regular
curriculum may also be "specially designed instruction" depending upon the
specific situation. Specially designed instruction can be vocational
instruction, physical education instruction, instruction in daily living skills,
adaptive behavior, community living skills, pre-vocational skills, or any
other instruction that a particular child may need because of his disability.7
The federal regulations' definitions of the different categories of
disabilities contain language indicating that for the child to be disabled
under one of the categories, the disability must adversely affect the child's
educational performance or result in some educational problem.72 A child's
eligibility can turn not only upon the interpretation of the "adversely affect"
language in the definition of a particular disability but also upon how the
"adverse effect" is determined. For example, a child with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) may, on a standardized test, score on the
same grade level as his non-disabled peers with subject area achievement
scores commensurate with his estimated intelligence level. 73 Looking at this
information, a school district may determine that although the child has
ADHD, there is no "adverse affect" on his educational performance caused
by the ADHD. However, this same child's school performance on a daily
basis may present an entirely different picture. He may be a poor student
because he cannot attend to tasks, is easily distracted, is excessively active,
or misses school because of frequent suspensions he receives for fighting.
All of these characteristics may be typical of a child with ADHD. ADHD
adversely affects daily school performance if the child cannot attend to his
work and remain in class or in school. Unfortunately, the tests some school
districts use to determine eligibility will not reflect this adverse affect on
daily performance. Therefore, it is important to know how a school district
interprets the term "adversely affects" and how it is determined. The
parents may need to challenge the schools' definition or method of
determining adverse effect.
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17 (1995).
72. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (1995).
73. Children with attention deficit disorders, with or without hyperactivity, may qualify
for special education under the "other health impaired category" if their condition requires
special education.
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IV. FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION
A "free appropriate public education" (FAPE) is defined under the
IDEA as special education and related services provided at public expense
that meets the state education agency's standards and are provided in
conformance with the child's IEP.74 The United States Supreme Court
provided guidance for determining whether a student has received FAPE in
Board of Education v. Rowley,75 the Court's first case involving IDEA. In
Rowley, the Court set forth a two fold inquiry for determining FAPE:
"First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And
second, is the individualized educational program developed through the
Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits?"76 This procedural test was based on Congress's belief
that compliance with the requirements of the Act would probably produce
substantive compliance. Rowley clearly established that a school district's
failure to comply with the Act's procedures constitutes a sufficient basis for
determining that a child has been denied a FAPE. Generally, courts only
overlook procedural violations when they are technical and no harm has
occurred to the student as a result.77
The substantive part of the Rowley test requires that a student's IEP be
reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits. The Court made it
clear that the IDEA does not entitle a child to an IEP designed to enable
him to reach his maximum potential. The IDEA ensures an "appropriate"
education, not the "best" education." However, courts interpreting Rowley
have made it clear that the educational benefit must be "meaningful" and not
de minimis.79 The difficulty in these cases is determining when a child has
received sufficient educational benefit. Several factors may prove helpful
to a court. The child's past progress or lack of progress may be the
strongest indicator. Courts have found that FAPE must produce progress,
not regression or de minimis benefit.80 In Peterson v. Hastings Public
School,8' the Eighth Circuit found that FAPE was generally provided when
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (1995).
75. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
76. Id. at 206-07 (footnote omitted).
77. See, e.g., Doe v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 915 F.2d 651 (1lth Cir. 1990); Doe v.
Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1990); Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d
973 (4th Cir. 1990); Evans v. District No. 17, 841 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1988).
78. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.
79. See, e.g., Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989); Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629
(4th Cir. 1985).
80. Hall, 774 F.2d at 629.
81. 31 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 1994).
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a child with a disability received personalized instruction with sufficient
support services to permit the child to benefit educationally with instruction
that approximated the grade levels in the school's regular program and
allowed the child to meet the state's educational standards, achieve passing
marks, and move forward from grade to grade.82
To determine if the IEP is reasonably calculated to provide educational
benefits, the child's unique needs must be analyzed. The concept "educa-
tional benefit" embraces more than academic subjects.8 3 To determine
FAPE for a child with a disability, an examination may also have to be
made of a child's progress in socialization, adaptive behavior, daily living,
speech or communication, mobility, and other nonacademic areas critical to
a disabled child's education."
In Rowley, the Supreme Court made it clear that the IDEA was the
"floor" of opportunity for children with disabilities and that states could
mandate higher standards. Arkansas initially had a higher standard by
providing for an education "sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the
capabilities of the disabled child."85 In 1989, legislation was passed to
reconcile Arkansas's standard with the federal standard of "appropriate"
education.86 Arguably, since that time, the General Assembly has raised the
standard in the case of children with visual impairments.8 7 This legislation,
in the author's opinion, does one of two things: (1) it either raises the
standard above the "floor" of opportunity under IDEA for students with
visual impairments, or (2) it defines, at least in part, what is "appropriate"
and thus the "floor" for students with visual impairments.
IV. LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT
The term "least restrictive environment" (LRE) has been applied to the
requirement that in order to receive funding under the IDEA, states must
ensure the following:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are
educated with children who are not disabled and that special classes,
82. Id. at 707.
83. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1995); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 864 F.2d 795
(11th Cir. 1988); Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1984).
84. For a child with a disability, education may encompass all areas of need related to
his disability. 34 C.F.R. § 300.17, 300.532(0 (1995).
85. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-41-202 (Michie 1993).
86. Id.
87. 1993 Ark. Acts 294.
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separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity
of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.88
This concept of LRE creates a presumption in favor of placing disabled
children with their non-disabled peers to the maximum extent possible while
still providing the child with an appropriate education.
LRE favors inclusion and mainstreaming for students for whom they
are appropriate but also recognizes that for some children to receive a
FAPE, they may need to be in a special class, school, residential facility,
hospital, or home. However, every step away from the regular class is a
more restrictive placement. The LRE requirement dictates that schools place
the student in the least restrictive placement (the placement closest to the
regular class) in which his educational needs can be met with the support of
supplementary aids and services.
Each school district is required to maintain a continuum of alternative
placement options to meet the varying needs of disabled children for special
education and related services.8 9 Courts are often called upon to resolve
tension between the FAPE requirement and the LRE requirement. However,
FAPE governs both requirements. The difficult issue is that an appropriate
education for an individual child may be the need to be with non-disabled
peers. In actual practice, a child's placement is often influenced by the
parents' and school personnel's philosophical approach to inclusive
education as well as the available options within the school district.
Courts have been somewhat inconsistent in their approach of LRE.
Several different tests have developed in the different circuits. The Sixth
Circuit uses a "replication" test.9" Under this test, if the services that make
the more restrictive environment appropriate can be replicated in the less
restrictive environment, then the more restrictive placement is too
restrictive." The Fifth Circuit uses what it considers to be a "less intrusive"
test.92 This test first asks whether education in the regular classroom with
the use of supplemental aids and services can be achieved satisfactorily for
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1988).
89. Straube v. Florida Union - Free Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1176 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). Through its state plan, the state is required to have procedures in place which will
ensure compliance and satisfaction of LRE requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1994);
34 C.F.R. § 300.132 (1995).
90. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Cincinnati
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Roncker, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
91. Id.
92. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
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the child, and if it cannot and the child will be placed in a more restrictive
environment, whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the
maximum extent appropriate.93 The Fifth Circuit went further to outline the
factors which should be considered in applying the first part of the test.
These factors include: whether the school has taken steps to accommodate
the child in the regular program; whether the child would receive educa-
tional benefit from regular education, considering that educational benefit
would include not only academic benefit but other benefits; and the effect
of the child's presence on the education of other students.94 As for the
second part of this test, the court stated that a determination of whether the
child was mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate would include
application of the first part of the test to each succeedingly more restrictive
placement.95
The Eleventh Circuit generally followed the Fifth Circuit's approach
but with some refinements as in Greer v. Rome City School District.96 The
Eleventh Circuit determined that in assessing educational benefit in the
regular placement, a comparison between expected benefits in that placement
and other placements may be made with the caveat that more academic
educational benefit may not justify the more restrictive placement if there
are considerable nonacademic benefits to be gained from the regular
classroom placement.97 A second Eleventh Circuit refinement addressed the
effect of the regular placement on the student's non-disabled peers;
specifically, whether the disabled child's inclusion in the classroom would
be so disruptive that the education of other students would be significantly
impaired.9 The Eleventh Circuit also cited cost as a factor if the cost of the
regular classroom placement is so great that it would significantly impact the
education of the other children in the district. 99
The Second Circuit uses yet another test which is markedly different
from all other circuits. It applies the Rowley procedural test"° to the LRE
issue, deferring to the decision made by the school district if the procedural
requirements have been followed and the placement was reasonably
calculated to provide educational benefit.11
93. Id. at 1048.
94. Id. at 1048-49.
95. Id. at 1050.
96. 950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 697 (citing Daniel, 874 F.2d at 1049).
98. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 Comment).
99. Id.
100. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
101. Briggs v. Board of Educ. of Conn., 882 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1989).
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The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have found the Rowley test
inapplicable to LRE. The Fifth Circuit has noted that the Rowley test
assumes that the school district has.met the procedural requirements, which
includes the LRE requirement, thus application of the Rowley test would
assume resolution of the issue before the court.
10 2
The Eighth Circuit has adopted the Fifth Circuit's test and has
specifically found the Rowley test inappropriate to the LRE issue because
the Supreme Court in Rowley did not intend for the Rowley test to be used
to determine mainstreaming issues. 03 LRE is evaluated as part of the
determination of procedural compliance, under the Fifth and Eighth Circuits'
interpretation.
V. RELATED SERVICES
Related services are defined in the IDEA as:
Transportation, and such other developmental, corrective and other
supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psycho-
logical services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including
therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services,
including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services except that such
medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as
may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special
education, and includes the early identification and assessment of
disabling conditions in children.'04
The IDEA regulations list additional related services including "school
health services, social work services in schools, and parent counseling and
training."'0 5  Neither list is exhaustive. Related services can be other
developmental, corrective, or supportive services that will assist a child to
benefit from special education. 6 The relationship to special education is
essential unless the state defines the particular related service as special
education. 7 In Arkansas, speech therapy services are defined as special
education so that speech therapy might be the extent of the special education
102. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing A.W.
v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d
1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983)).
103. A.W., 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
104. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994).
105. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a) (1995).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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the child receives. In other cases, speech therapy might be a related service
if the child receives other special education as well as speech therapy.'0 s
Related services must be provided at no cost to the parent but must be
included in the child's IEP in order to trigger the school district's responsi-
bility to secure and pay for these services.0 9 Many parents do not know
what related services are available to assist with their child's education, so
they do not request any services. Many districts do not offer certain related
services if a parent does not ask for them and the service is thus not
included in the IEP. The risk to districts in not informing parents of
possible related services is that the parent at some point will raise the issue
of the appropriateness of the child's education. Failing to ask for a related
service is not relevant in determining whether the service was necessary to
provide the child with an appropriate education.
VI. REMEDIES
A. Reimbursement
Parents are entitled to reimbursement for expenses they have accumu-
lated in providing their child with FAPE when the school district has failed
to do so. In School Committee v. Department of Education,"' the Supreme
Court held that parents were entitled to reimbursement for expenses related
to the unilateral placement of their child which was ultimately held to have
been necessary to provide the child with FAPE."'
Parents have regularly been reimbursed for a variety of expenses such
as expenses, cost of residential placement, and related services." 2 Occa-
sional reimbursement has been given for such expenses as the cost of travel
and lodging, when the private placement is out of town, and for interest paid
on a loan to fund the private placement." 3
108. ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., PROCEDURES, supra note 7; ARKANSAS DEP'T OF
EDUC., STANDARDS, supra note 7.
109. 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(a)(3) (1995).
110. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Fisher v. District of Columbia, 828 F. Supp. 87 (D.D.C. 1993); Babb v.
Knox County Sch. Sys., 965 F.2d 104 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992); Rapid
City Sch. Dist. v. Vahle, 922 F.2d 476 (8th Cir. 1990), affg 733 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D.
1990).
113. See, e.g., Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 428 (1994); Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ. v. SO., 19 IDELR 15 (D.N.J. 1992).
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B. Compensatory Services
Compensatory educational services are available to remedy the progress
lost by a student due to the denial of a FAPE. The leading case for the
majority view on this issue is Meiner v. Missouri,"4 an Eighth Circuit case.
In Meiner, the court likened compensatory services to retroactive reimburse-
ment in School Committee and held that imposing liability for compensatory
services on a school district merely required the school district to pay what
it should have paid all along." 5 Additionally, the court found that such
services would be necessary to secure the child's FAPE." 6 A finding that
the school district has denied a child FAPE is sufficient to trigger the
possibility of compensatory education."' It is important to note that bad
faith is not necessary to a finding that compensatory services are appropri-
ate.1 8
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy and Judicial Review
The IDEA requires that parties seeking relief pursue their administrative
remedies to conclusion before seeking judicial relief."9 Prior to filing suit
under IDEA, parents must exhaust the state's due process procedures. 2 ' If
parents or the school district are aggrieved by a hearing officer's decision,'
they may seek an appeal of that decision. In Arkansas, such appeals must
be filed within thirty days of the date the hearing decision was rendered.'
Parties seeking to sue under the IDEA generally cannot circumvent the
exhaustion requirement by suing under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
or section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Any party dissatisfied with the
final administrative decision in a due process proceeding may initiate a state
or federal suit.
114. 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
115. Id. at 755-56.
116. Meiner v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753-54 (8th Cir. 1986).
117. Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860 (D.N.H. 1992).
118. Todd D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1991).
119. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1994).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 1415(e) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 300.509 (1995).
122. 1995 Ark. Acts 203; ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-41-216 (Michie Supp. 1995).
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D. Scope of Review
The IDEA requires courts to base their decision upon a preponderance
of the evidence and provides for courts to hear additional evidence at the
request of a party.'23 Many courts interpret this statutory language as
requiring a de novo review. The Supreme Court in Rowley made reference
to Congress's intent that courts were to make independent decisions based
on the preponderance of the evidence. 4 Thus, some courts have empha-
sized the "independent decision" language in supporting their interpretation
of a de novo review.
25
A few courts have limited the role of the court in reviewing administra-
tive decisions by calling for deference to the decision below. 26  These
courts essentially place the burden of proof on the party seeking to overturn
the decision.'27 Other courts have placed the burden of proof on the party
trying to change the status quo. 28 However, when LRE has been the issue,
the burden has been placed on the school district.'29 Courts have generally
declined to consider issues which could have been raised below but were
not. 1
3 0
F. Damages
There has been substantial litigation over the authority of the courts to
award monetary damages to plaintiffs who prevail in actions under IDEA.
The majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that
monetary damages are generally not available.' 3' However, a minority of
courts have held that such damages are available.'32
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1994).
124. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1984).
125. See, e.g., Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1991); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 864 F.2d 795 (11th
Cir. 1988); School Bd. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1985).
126. Karl v. Board of Educ., 736 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1984).
127. See, e.g., Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 859 (1991).
128. See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
129. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
130. See Slack v. State of Del. Dept. of Pub. Instruction, 826 F. Supp. 115 (D. Del.
1993).
131. The leading case is Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
132. See Jackson v. Franklin County Sch. Bd., 806 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1986).
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The Supreme Court, through its opinion in Franklin v. Gwimmett
County Public School,'33 has given new life to this debate. In Franklin, a
Title IX case, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision holding that
monetary damages were not available. The Court found that, in a cogniza-
ble cause of action brought under a federal statute, all appropriate remedies
are available unless Congress had expressly indicated otherwise."M Since the
IDEA expressly authorizes courts to fashion "appropriate relief' and does
not expressly prohibit any form of relief, the Franklin rationale may be
applicable to cases brought under IDEA.-
G. Attorney's Fees
In 1986, Congress amended the IDEA to allow recovery of attorney's
fees. This amendment was in part a response to Smith v. Robinson.1
35
Hearing officers are not thought to have this authority because the statutory
language authorizes "courts" to award attorney's fees and costs.'36
Parents may recover attorney's fees and costs "in any action or
proceeding" brought under the IDEA in which they are a "prevailing
party."'137 "Any action or proceeding" has been determined to include a due
process hearing, mediation, settlement of due process disputes, and civil
actions. In some cases fee recovery has been allowed for IEP
conferences.138 To be a "prevailing party" for attorney's fee purposes, it is
sufficient if the parent prevailed on any significant issue that achieved some
of the benefits sought.139 "Significant issue" does not require that the parent
be successful on a primary issue or that the parent achieve all of the relief
requested. 4 0
Courts have awarded attorney's fees for work performed prior to a due
process hearing, time spent in monitoring and enforcing a judgment, and
time spent in an action to recover attorney's fees and costs.' Reasonable
133. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
134. Id.
135. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). The court determined that the IDEA provides the exclusive
remedy and did not permit the awarding of attorney's fees whether within the body of the
statute or by recourse to other federal statutes such as § 1988. Id. at 1003.
136. IOSEP Policy Letter, 18 IDELR 1305 (1992).
137. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) (1994).
138. See, e.g., Mitten v. Muscogee County Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); E.M. v. Millville Bd. of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312 (D.N.J.
1994); Capiello v. District of Columbia, 779 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
139. See, e.g., Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1990).
140. See Phelan v. Bell, 8 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1993).
141. See, e.g., Barlow-Gresham Union High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280
(9th Cir. 1991); Moore v. Crestwood Local Sch. Dist., 804 F. Supp. 960 (N.D. Ohio 1992);
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fees for experts including costs of tests or evaluations performed in
preparation for the parents' case are reimbursed as costs. Work of a
paraprofessional, such as law clerks, paralegals, and recent law graduates is
also compensable 42 The standard for calculating attorney's fees under
other attorney fee statutes is generally applicable to fee awards under the
IDEA. However, the IDEA prohibits the use of any bonus or multipliers.
Attorney fee actions in IDEA cases may be different from such actions
in other litigation. Ordinarily an attorney fee petition will occur in
conjunction with the underlying action. In cases where a parent is seeking
attorneys fees for representation in a due process proceeding, the court
hearing the fee petition will have no underlying suit before it. The cause of
action will be exclusively one for fees.
A parent who successfully sues for attorney's fees for representation in
an IDEA proceeding, may also collect attorney's fees and costs expended
for legal representation in the attorney fee action under the IDEA provision
that provides fees for the initial proceeding.
VII. CONCLUSION
School districts are obligated to provide parents of children with
disabilities or suspected disabilities with a full explanation of the procedural
safeguards available to the parent under the IDEA.'43 School districts meet
this obligation by providing a prescribed form, setting forth the federal
regulatory provisions related to procedural safeguards, developed by the
Arkansas Department of Education.'" This form does a poor job of
advising parents of their rights under IDEA although it meets the technical
requirement to inform parents. 4 Many school district personnel do not
understand parents' rights under IDEA sufficiently to fully explain the
information contained in the parents rights form. Additionally, even if
school personnel have an adequate understanding of parents rights under
IDEA, they have little incentive to be sure a parent fully understands those
rights. A well informed parent who fully understands her rights is likely to
place greater demands on a school's resources than one who believes there
are limits to what a school must do for her child unrelated to the child's
Borengasser v. Arkansas State Bd. of Educ., 996 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1993).
142. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
143. 20 U.S.C. 1415 (b)(1)(D) (1990).
144. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., Procedures, supra note 7, part VIII (addressing parents'
rights under Pub. L. No. 94-142).
145. The language is largely repetitive of the federal regulatory language and is not
presented within a context that would allow parents to see how the rights relate to their
situation.
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FAPE. Thus parents frequently become fully informed only when they have
access to legal representation by someone knowledgeable in this area of
practice. Once a parent becomes fully informed, resolution of parent /
district disputes may be resolved quickly if the district has access to legal
representation by someone knowledgeable in the field. Two knowledgeable
attorneys can quickly determine the potential outcome of a dispute if it is
litigated and can identify those areas in which there is truly a question about
the outcome.
It is in a school districts' best financial interest to settle quickly
disputes that are likely to be resolved in the parent's favor. It not only
saves the district the cost of its own legal representation but cuts down on
the amount of fees it may owe for the parent's representation. Resolving
disputes by settlement is in the parent's best interest so long as the needs of
the child are met as a result.
Litigation, even in the form of a due process hearing, should always be
the last resort for a parent, after efforts to get a school district to voluntarily
meet a child's needs have been exhausted. However, with an uncooperative
or uninformed school district, due process should be pursued without
hesitation if a child's FAPE is at stake, once efforts at cooperative resolution
have failed.
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